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How Shall the Constitution
be Enforced?
A Preview of Minneci v. Pollard
By John F. Preis

12 Richmond Law

illustration by robert meganck

A

mericans love their Constitution. A typical visit to
Washington, D.C., might
involve a trip to the
National Air and Space Museum, a tour
of the monuments on an amphibious
bus and, quite strangely, veneration of a
legal document. That’s right, Americans
will stand in a long, snaking line outside the National Archives just to see,
for a fleeting moment, their cherished
Constitution. It’s enough to make the
Restatement of Torts positively jealous.
But perhaps the Restatement
deserves a bit more respect. Tort law,

just like much of constitutional law, protects us from
invasions of bodily integrity. If a government officer
invades this integrity, maybe a tort action could provide
the same relief as a civil rights action. Or maybe not.
That is the question presented in Minneci v. Pollard,
a case I argued before the United States Supreme Court
this term. The plaintiff in Minneci, Richard Lee Pollard,
suffered several Eighth Amendment violations while a
federal prisoner in 2001. After accidentally breaking both
his elbows, Pollard was denied adequate medical care,
nutrition, and hygiene. Given these constitutional violations, Pollard did what many prisoners do: He brought a
civil rights action in federal court seeking damages.
Pollard’s suit did not proceed like an ordinary civil
rights action, however. The district court dismissed
Pollard’s suit because Pollard arguably had tort remedies
under state law. Where common law remedies are available, the district court appeared to believe, there is no
need to, as the saying goes, make a federal case out it.
The district court’s opinion was an interpretation
of the Supreme Court’s “Bivens doctrine.” In a series of
decisions starting with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Court has defined the circumstances under
which federal officers may be sued for constitutional
damages. (Bivens concerns only the liability of federal
officers; the liability of state officers is controlled by the
well-known statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.)
Bivens actions are not popular with the modern
Court. Time and again, the Court has turned away
Bivens plaintiffs, usually with the observation that it is
Congress, not the Court, that should be deciding who
may sue federal officers. In some cases, the Court has
gone so far as to suggest that a constitutional damages
remedy is not necessary where a similar remedy could
be had under state tort law. These scattered references
to state law in the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence are
what doomed Pollard’s suit in the district court.
In May 2007, I came across the district court’s
ruling in Pollard’s case. At the time, I was researching
the value of state remedies in upholding constitutional
norms and felt certain that the district court had made
a mistake. I wrote Pollard and offered to represent
him pro bono on appeal. He accepted and I quickly
filed a notice of appeal. Three long years later, Pollard
and I prevailed before the Ninth Circuit. Our victory
was short-lived, however: This past May, the Supreme
Court decided to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
In Minneci, the Court will decide how, at least in
some cases, the Constitution shall be enforced. The

Court could decide, as Pollard and I contend, that constitutional rights should be enforced through traditional
civil rights actions. Or the Court could decide that tort
law protects the same interests covered by constitutional
law and that common law actions will therefore keep
federal actors in line with constitutional norms.
The core of our argument before the Court is that
tort law, though hypothetically applicable in the prison
setting, lacks specific content as to prisoners’ rights.
Take, for instance, one of Pollard’s Eighth Amendment
claims—the deprivation of food and hygiene. To hold
that tort law would provide Pollard and all other federal
prisoners with relief, the Court would need to find that
tort law in every state imposes a duty of care on jailers
and that this duty encompasses obligations to provide
adequate food and hygiene. It is of course possible that
state common law might provide such relief, but the case
law on this issue is sparse if not nonexistent—principally
because constitutional rights have long been enforced on
their own terms, not through the proxy of state tort law.
Another problem with relying on state remedies to
enforce constitutional rights is that state law will vary
between states, and also vary over time within each state.
The common law rights of prisoners in California will be
different from prisoners in Florida, and the rights in both
states will undoubtedly be different in the future than
they are today. This variability makes state law a poor
replacement for federal law, which by its very nature, is
intended to be uniform across the entire country.
None of this is to suggest that states should not
attempt to protect civil rights through their
common law, or that federal prisoners ought
not to press their common law actions.
It is simply to say that the Constitution
cherished by so many Americans is distinctive both in its content and national reach.
The Court should heed this in Minneci
and hold that Pollard’s constitutional
rights are enforceable without regard to
the content of state law. n
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